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Abstract
We study the problem of allocating indivisible goods among n agents in a fair manner. For
this problem, maximin share (MMS) is a well-studied solution concept which provides a fair-
ness threshold. Specifically, maximin share is defined as the minimum utility that an agent
can guarantee for herself when asked to partition the set of goods into n bundles such that the
remaining (n− 1) agents pick their bundles adversarially. An allocation is deemed to be fair if
every agent gets a bundle whose valuation is at least her maximin share.
Even though maximin shares provide a natural benchmark for fairness, it has its own draw-
backs and, in particular, it is not sufficient to rule out unsatisfactory allocations. Motivated by
these considerations, in this work we define a stronger notion of fairness, called groupwise
maximin share guarantee (GMMS). In GMMS, we require that the maximin share guarantee is
achieved not just with respect to the grand bundle, but also among all the subgroups of agents.
Hence, this solution concept strengthens MMS and provides an ex-post fairness guarantee. We
show that in specific settings, GMMS allocations always exist. We also establish the existence
of approximate GMMS allocations under additive valuations, and develop a polynomial-time
algorithm to find such allocations. Moreover, we establish a scale of fairness wherein we show
that GMMS implies approximate envy freeness.
Finally, we empirically demonstrate the existence of GMMS allocations in a large set of
randomly generated instances. For the same set of instances, we additionally show that our
algorithm achieves an approximation factor better than the established, worst-case bound.
1 Introduction
In recent years, the topic of fair division of indivisible goods has received significant attention in
the computer science, mathematics, and economics communities, see, for instance, Chapter 12
in [Brandt et al., 2016]. A central motivation behind this thread of research is the fact that classical
notions of fairness—such as envy freeness (EF)1 and proportionality2—which were developed for
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1An allocation is called envy free if every agent values her bundle at least as much she values any other agent’s
bundle [Foley, 1967, Varian, 1974, Stromquist, 1980].
2An allocation, among n agents, is called proportionally fair if every agent’s value for her share is at least 1/n times
the total value of all the goods [Steinhaus, 1948].
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divisible goods (that can be fractionally allocated), do not translate well to the indivisible case.
For instance, if there is a single indivisible good and two agents, then no allocation can guarantee
EF or proportionality. But, given that a number of real-world settings (such as budgeted course
allocations [Budish, 2011], division of inheritance, and partitioning resources in a cloud computing
environment) entail allocation of discrete/indivisible goods, it is essential to define and study
solution concepts which are applicable for a fair division of indivisible goods.
Classically, the applicability of solution concepts is studied via existence results. Understand-
ing if and when a solution concept is guaranteed to exist is of fundamental importance in mi-
croeconomics and other related fields. Such existence results have been notably complemented
by research—in algorithmic game theory and artificial intelligence—that has focused on compu-
tational issues surrounding the underlying solution concepts. Broadly, our results contribute to
these key themes by establishing both existential and algorithmic results for a new notion of fair-
ness.
In the context of fair division, the focus on developing efficient algorithms is motivated, in
part, by websites such as Spliddit3 [Goldman and Procaccia, 2015] and Adjusted Winner4 [Brams
and King, 2005], which offer fair solutions for dividing goods. Spliddit has attracted more than
fifty thousand users and, among other services, it computes allocations which are fair with respect
to the standard notions of fairness. One of the solution concepts considered by Spliddit is the
maximin share guarantee (MMS).
The MMS solution concept was defined in the notable work of [Budish, 2011], and it deems
an allocation to be fair if each agent gets a bundle of value greater than or equal to an agent-
specific threshold, called the maximin share of the agent. Specifically, the maximin share of an agent
corresponds to the maximum value that the agent can attain for herself if she is hypothetically
asked to partition the set of goods into n bundles and, then, the remaining (n−1) agents pick their
bundles adversarially. Hence, a risk-averse agent i would partition the goods (into n bundles)
such that value of the least desirable bundle (according to her) in the partition is maximized. The
value of the least desirable bundle in such a partition is called the maximin share of agent i. This
definition can be interpreted as a natural generalization of the classical cut-and-choose protocol.
Although maximin shares provide a natural benchmark to define fairness, this solution con-
cept has its own drawbacks. In particular, MMS is not sufficient to rule out unsatisfactory al-
locations; see Section 3 for an example. Moreover, different MMS allocations can be drastically
different in terms of, say, the social welfare of the agents.
Motivated by these considerations, we define a strictly stronger notion of fairness, called group-
wise maximin share guarantee (GMMS). Intuitively, GMMS provides an ex-post fairness guarantee:
it ensures that, even after the allocation has been made, the maximin share guarantee is achieved
not just with respect to the grand bundle of goods, but also among all the subgroups of agents
J ⊆ [n]. Specifically, we say that an allocation is GMMS if, for all groups J ⊆ [n] and agents i ∈ J ,
the value of i’s bundle in the allocation is no less than the maximin share of i restricted to J . That
is, if the agent i were to repeat the thought experiment (of dividing all the goods allocated to the
3www.spliddit.org
4http://www.nyu.edu/projects/adjustedwinner/
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agents in group J , so that the other |J | − 1 agents pick their bundles adversarially) to calculate
her maximin share restricted to J , then the value of her bundle is at least this threshold. This def-
inition directly ensures that groupwise maximin share guarantee is a stronger solution concept:
GMMS implies MMS. In Section 3, we show that GMMS can, in fact, be arbitrarily better than an
allocation that just satisfies MMS.
GMMS also strictly generalizes pairwise maximin share guarantee (PMMS), a notion defined
by [Caragiannis et al., 2016]. In PMMS, the maximin share guarantee is required only for pairs
of agents, but not necessarily for the grand bundle. Section 2.1, provides an example which estab-
lishes that GMMS is a strict generalization of PMMS and MMS.
The relevance of GMMS is also substantiated by the fact that it implies other complementary
notions of fairness, which do not follow from MMS alone. In the context of indivisible goods,
relaxations of envy freeness, such as EF15 [Budish, 2011] and EFX6 [Caragiannis et al., 2016]
have also been studied. In Section 4 we show that (unlike MMS) GMMS fits into this scale of
fairness and, in particular, a GMMS allocation is guaranteed to be EFX (and hence EF1). These
implications essentially follow from the observation that, by definition, a GMMS allocation is
PMMS as well. [Caragiannis et al., 2016] have shown that PMMS implies EFX, and hence we
obtain the desired implications.
Throughout the paper, we focus on additive valuations, and a high-level contribution of our
work is to show that under additive valuations, a number of useful (existence, algorithmic, and
approximation) results which have been established for MMS continue to hold for GMMS as well.
1.1 Our Contributions
In addition to proving a scale of fairness for GMMS, we establish the following results:
1. Approximate groupwise maximin share allocations always exist under additive valuations.
Prior work has shown that there are instances wherein no allocation is MMS [Procaccia and
Wang, 2014, Kurokawa et al., 2016]. These non-existence results have motivated a detailed
study of approximate MMS allocations, i.e., allocations in which each agent gets a bundle
of value (multiplicatively) close to her maximin share. Along these lines, we consider ap-
proximate GMMS (see Definition 3), and show that, under additive valuations, a 1/2-GMMS
allocation always exists. In addition, such an allocation can be found in polynomial time.
2. GMMS allocations are guaranteed to exist when the valuations of the agents are either binary
or identical.
3. Analogous to the experimental results for MMS [Bouveret and Lemaıˆtre, 2014], GMMS allo-
cations exist empirically. These simulation results indicate that we do not fall short on such
generic existence results by strengthening the maximin solution concept.
5An allocation is said to be envy-free up to one good (EF1) if no agent envies any other after removing at most one
good from the other agent’s bundle; see Definition 4.
6An allocation is said to be envy-free up to the least valued good (EFX) if no agent envies any other agent after
removing any positively valued good from the other agent’s bundle; see Definition 5.
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1.2 Related Work
As mentioned earlier, [Budish, 2011] introduced the notion of maximin share guarantee (MMS),
and it has been extensively studied since then. In particular, [Bouveret and Lemaıˆtre, 2014] showed
that if the agents’ valuations are additive, then an envy free (or proportional) allocation will be
MMS as well. They also established that MMS exists under binary, additive valuations. Their
experiments, using different distributions over the valuations, did not yield a single example
wherein an MMS allocation did not exist. [Kurokawa et al., 2016] showed that MMS allocations
exist with high probability when valuations are drawn randomly.
However, [Procaccia and Wang, 2014] provided intricate counterexamples to refute the uni-
versal existence of MMS allocations, even under additive valuations. This motivated the study
of approximate maximin share allocations, α-MMS, where each agent obtains a bundle of value
at least α ∈ (0, 1) times her maximin share. [Procaccia and Wang, 2014] established the existence
of 2/3-MMS, and developed a polynomial-time algorithm to obtain such an allocation when the
number of agents is a fixed constant. Later, [Amanatidis et al., 2015] showed that a 2/3-MMS can
be computed in polynomial (in the number of players) time.
Approximate maximin share allocations have also been studied for general valuations. [Bar-
man and Krishnamurthy, 2017] have developed an efficient algorithm which finds a 1/10-MMS
allocation under submodular valuations. More recently, [Ghodsi et al., 2017] have improved the
approximation guarantee for additive valuations to 3/4. They have also developed constant-factor
approximation guarantees for submodular and XOS valuations, along with a logarithmic approx-
imation for subadditive valuations.
[Aziz et al., 2017] studied the fair division of indivisible chores (negatively valued goods) and
have developed an efficient algorithm which finds a 2-MMS allocation.
[Caragiannis et al., 2016] defined another important fairness notion called pairwise maximin
share guarantee (PMMS). As mentioned previously, under PMMS, the maximin share guarantee is
required only for pairs of agents, and not even for the grand bundle. They also established that
PMMS and MMS are incomparable: neither one of these solution concepts implies the other.
2 Preliminaries and Notation
We consider the problem of finding a fair allocation of a set of indivisible goods [m] = {1, . . . ,m},
among a set of agents [n] = {1, . . . , n}. For a subset of goods S ⊆ [m] and integer t, let Πt(S)
denote the set of all t partitions of S. An allocation is defined as an n-partition (A1, A2, . . . , An) ∈
Πn([m]), where Ai is the set of goods allocated to agent i.
The preference of the agents over the goods is specified via valuations. Specifically, we de-
note the valuation of an agent i ∈ [n] for a subset of goods S ⊆ [m] by vi(S). In this work,
we assume the valuations to be non-negative and additive, i.e., vi ({g}) ≥ 0 for all g ∈ [m] and
vi(S) =
∑
g∈S vi ({g}). For ease of presentation, we will use vi(g) for agent i’s valuation of good
g, i.e., for vi({g}).
As mentioned previously, the fairness notions considered in this work are defined using thresh-
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olds called maximin shares. Formally, given an agent i, parameter k ∈ Z+, and subset of goods S ⊆
[m], k-maximin share of i restricted to S is defined as µki (S) := max(P1,...,Pk)∈Πk(S) minj∈[k] vi(Pj).
Throughout, MMSi will be used to denote the maximin share of an agent i with respect to the
grand bundle, MMSi := µni ([m]). We will now formally define maximin share allocation (MMS
allocation).
Definition 1 (Maximin Share Allocation). An allocation (A1, . . . , An) is said to be a maximin share
allocation (MMS) iff for all agents i ∈ [n] we have vi(Ai) ≥ MMSi.
A different solution concept defined by [Caragiannis et al., 2016] requires the maximin share
guarantee to hold only for every pair of agents, i.e., an allocation A = (A1, . . . , An) is said to
achieve pairwise maximin share guarantee (PMMS) iff for all i, j ∈ [n], we have vi(Ai) ≥ µ2i (Ai ∪Aj)
and vj(Aj) ≥ µ2j (Ai ∪Aj).
In this paper, we strengthen MMS and PMMS, and define a stronger threshold for each agent
i ∈ [n], namely groupwise maximin share (GMMSi). Formally,
GMMSi := max
J⊆[n],J3i
µ
|J |
i
⋃
j∈J
Aj
 .
Now we define groupwise maximin share allocation (GMMS allocation).
Definition 2 (Groupwise Maximin Share Allocation). An allocation (A1, . . . , An) is said to be a group-
wise maximin share allocation (GMMS) iff for all agents i ∈ [n] we have vi(Ai) ≥ GMMSi.
Note that an allocation (A1, . . . , An) is GMMS iff vi(Ai) ≥ µ|J |i
(⋃
j∈J Aj
)
for all J ⊆ [n] such
that i ∈ J . Also, the threshold GMMSi is a function of the underlying allocation and, in contrast,
MMSi depends only the valuation of agent i for the m goods and the number of agents n.
The fact that there are fair division instances which do not admit an MMS allocation directly
implies that GMMS allocation are not guaranteed to exist either. Therefore, we consider approxi-
mate GMMS allocations.
Definition 3 (Approximate Groupwise Maximin Share Allocation). An allocation (A1, . . . , An) is
said to be an α-approximate groupwise maximin share allocation (α-GMMS) iff for all agents i ∈ [n] we
have vi(Ai) ≥ αGMMSi.
A 1-approximate groupwise maximin share allocation is a GMMS allocation.
2.1 GMMS Strictly Generalizes MMS and PMMS
This section shows that GMMS is a distinct solution concept which strictly generalizes both MMS
and PMMS. In fact, the instance constructed in this section shows that there exists allocations
which are MMS and, furthermore, satisfy the maximin share guarantee for all subgroups of size
at most k (say), but do not satisfy the GMMS criteria.
We now formally define the notion of maximin share guarantee for a subgroup of size k. For
ease of presentation, we call such allocations k-wise fair. An allocation A = (A1, . . . , An) is said to
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be k-wise fair iff for all agents i ∈ [n] and for all size-k subsets J ⊆ [n] such that i ∈ J , the following
holds: vi(Ai) ≥ µki
(⋃
j∈J Aj
)
.
In the following example we identify an allocation which is t-wise fair—for each t < k—but
not k-wise fair; here, k ≥ 4. Let us consider 3k − 4 goods and n agents, with n > 3k − 4. Since the
number of agents is greater than the number of goods, MMSi = 0 for all i ∈ [n] and, hence, all the
allocations are MMS. Consider an agent, say i = 1, and let her valuation for the 3k − 4 goods be
• 3k − 7 for the first k − 1 goods l1, l2, . . . , lk−1 (“large” goods),
• 3 for the next k − 2 goods d2, . . . , dk−1 (“medium-sized” goods), and
• 1 for the remaining k − 1 goods s1, ..., sk−1 (“small” goods).
The valuation of other agents can be set to ensure fairness for them. Let allocation A =
(A1, . . . , An) be such that A1 = {l1}, A2 = {l2, d2}, . . ., Ak−1 = {lk−1, dk−1}, Ak = {s1, ..., sk−1}
and Ar = ∅ for all r ≥ k, i.e., no goods are allocated to the last n − k agents. We first show that
the bundle allocated to agent 1 is at least her pairwise maximin share with any other agent j ∈ [n].
Agent 1 does not envy agent k since v1(l1) = 3k − 7 > k − 1 = v1(Ak) (since k ≥ 4). Moreover, for
the other agents j ∈ {2, . . . , k − 1}, we have µ21({l1, lj , dj}) = 3k − 7 = v1({l1}) = v1(A1). Thus,
A ensures PMMS. Below, we present a case analysis which shows that A is also t-wise fair, for all
t ≤ k − 1.
1. Consider any subgroup J of the first k − 1 agents, containing agent 1. Let |J | = t. In this
case, exactly 2t − 1 goods are allocated to the group of agents J . In particular, this set of
goods consists of t “large” goods and t − 1 “medium-sized” goods. Hence, any t-partition
of these 2t − 1 goods will have at least one bundle with at most one good. Therefore, any
partition which maximizes the least valued (with respect to the valuation of agent 1) bundle
will have one bundle containing a “large” good, and each of the remaining t − 1 bundles
containing one “large” and one “medium-sized” good. Therefore, the allocation A1 = {l1}
ensures maximin share guarantee for agent 1 for all subgroups J ⊆ {1, . . . , k − 1}, which
contain agent 1.
2. Next, consider any subgroup J of size t which includes agent k as well as agent 1. Here, the
set of goods allocated to agents in J consists of t − 1 “large” goods, t − 2 “medium-sized”
goods and k− 1 “small” goods. To simplify the analysis, we assume that t = k/2 and use an
averaging argument to obtain
µt1 (∪j∈JAj) ≤
(3k − 7)(t− 1) + 3(t− 2) + 1(k − 1)
t
= 3k − 4− 2k
t
≤ 3k − 4− 4 (since t ≤ k/2)
= 3k − 8
< 3k − 7 = v1(A1).
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Hence, for all such subgroups of agents of size t ≤ k/2, the bundle A1 = {l1} satisfies the
maximin share guarantee of agent 1. A similar, but slightly involved argument establishes
the result for subgroups of size t ≤ k − 1.
3. Finally, consider a size-t subgroup J ∈ [n] such that 1 ∈ J and J contains at least one agent
h > k, i.e., J includes an agent h with an empty bundle Ah = ∅. Write J ′ := J \ {h : h > k}
and |J ′| = t′. The arguments used in the first two cases show that the maximin guarantee
for agent 1 holds for J ′, i.e., v1(A1) ≥ µt′1 (∪j∈J ′ Aj). Using the fact that t′ < t and ∪j∈J ′ Aj =
∪j∈J Aj , we get µt′1 (∪j∈J ′ Aj) ≥ µt1(∪j∈J Aj). These observations establish the required
maximin share guarantee, v1(A1) ≥ µt1(∪j∈J Aj), for this case as well.
Overall, we get that the allocation A satisfies t-wise fairness, for any t < k. We will complete the
analysis by showing that A is not k-wise fair.
In particular, let J = [k]. Note that, here, the set ∪j∈JAj consists of k − 1 “large” goods, k − 2
“medium-sized” goods and k−1 “small” goods. In addition, the maximin share value with respect
to this subgroup is 3k− 6: partition the goods to obtain one bundle containing all k− 2 “medium-
sized” goods (each of value 3) and, additionally, k − 1 bundles each containing one “large” good
and one “small” good. Therefore, µk1 (∪j∈JAj) = 3k − 6 > 3k − 7 = v1(A1).
This example illustrates that, in particular, GMMS is a stronger solution concept than PMMS
and MMS.
3 GMMS can be arbitrarily better than MMS
In this section, we provide a class of examples where an MMS allocation is not necessarily sat-
isfactory in terms of agents’ valuations. In particular, we show that imposing GMMS leads to
allocations which Pareto dominate an allocation which only satisfies MMS.
Consider n agents and a set of n+ 3 goods (where [m] = {g1, . . . , gn+3}), along with parameter
V and a sufficiently small ε; 0 < ε  V . The valuations are assumed to be additive and are as
follows:
For agents i ∈ {1, . . . , n− 1},
vi({gz}) =

V, z ∈ {1, . . . , n− 3}
V/2, z ∈ {n− 2, n− 1}
V/2− ε, z ∈ {n, n+ 2}
V/2 + ε, z ∈ {n+ 1, n+ 3}
For the agent n,
vn({gz}) =

V, z ∈ {1, . . . , n− 1}
0, z ∈ {n, n+ 1}
ε, z ∈ {n+ 2, n+ 3}
Note that in this fair division instance the maximin share of the first (n− 1) agents, MMSi = V
for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n− 1}. In addition, the maximin share of the last agent, MMSn, is 2ε.
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Now, consider the allocation A = (A1, . . . , An) wherein Ai = {gi}, i ∈ {1, . . . , n − 3}, An−2 =
{gn−2, gn−1}, An−1 = {gn, gn+1}, and An = {gn+2, gn+3}. Allocation A is MMS since vi(Ai) =
V for each i ∈ {1, . . . , n − 1} and vn(An) = 2ε. In this allocation the valuation of agent n is
unsatisfactorily low. Another relevant observation is that this allocation is not GMMS. Below,
we show that in this instance any GMMS allocation allocates a bundle of value V to every agent,
including agent n.
The fact that A is not GMMS follows by considering the goods allocated to agents n − 2 and
n, i.e., let S := An−2 ∪ An = {gn−2, gn−1, gn+1, gn+3}. Now, µ2n(S) = V + ε, but vn(An) = 2ε  V .
Furthermore, it can be observed that it is necessary to allocate the agent n at least one of her high
valued goods {1, . . . , n − 1} to satisfy GMMS. Thus, GMMS allocation would always ensure that
a bundle of at least V is allocated to all the agents. That is, in this instance, unsatisfactorily low
valuations can be avoided by imposing the groupwise maximin share guarantee.
4 Scale of Fairness
As mentioned earlier, envy freeness (EF) is a well-studied solution concept in the context of fair
division of divisible items. However, for indivisible goods, a simple example with one positively
valued good and two agents shows that envy-free allocations do not always exist. Hence, for
indivisible goods, natural relaxations of envy freeness—in particular, EF1 and EFX—have been
considered in the literature. We now provide formal definitions of these relaxations.
Definition 4 (Envy-free up to one good [Budish, 2011]). An allocation A = (A1, A2, . . . , An) is said
to be envy-free up to one good (EF1) iff for every pair of agents i, j ∈ [n] there exists a good g ∈ Aj such
that vi(Ai) ≥ vi(Aj \ {g}).
Definition 5 (Envy-free up to the least positively valued good [Caragiannis et al., 2016]). An allo-
cation A = (A1, A2, . . . , An) is said to be envy-free up to the least valued good (EFX) iff for every pair of
agents i, j ∈ [n] and for all goods g ∈ Aj ∩ {g′ ∈ [m] | vi(g′) > 0} (i.e., for all goods g in Aj which are
positively valued by agent i) we have vi(Ai) ≥ vi(Aj \ {g}).
Note that the above mentioned definitions imply that, for additive valuations, an EFX alloca-
tion is necessarily EF1 as well. Next we show that, interestingly, these relaxed versions of envy
freeness are implied by GMMS, but not by MMS.
Proposition 1 (Scale of Fairness). In any fair division instance with additive valuations
1. If an allocation A is envy free (EF) then it achieves groupwise maximin share guarantee (GMMS) as
well.
2. If an allocation B is GMMS then it is EFX (and, hence, EF1) as well.
Proof. First we will show that EF implies GMMS: Assume that the allocation A = (A1, . . . , An) is
envy free, that is, for all i, j ∈ [n] we have vi(Ai) ≥ vi(Aj). Therefore, for any agent i and any group
of agents J ⊆ [n] we have |J |vi(Ai) ≥
∑
j∈J vi(Aj). Since the valuation vi is additive, this inequal-
ity leads to the following bound vi(Ai) ≥ 1|J |vi(S); here S = ∪j∈JAj . Now, an averaging argument
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establishes the following inequality: for any |J |-partition of S if (P1, P2, . . . , P|J |) ∈ Π|J |(S) then
vi(Ai) ≥ min1≤k≤|J | vi(Pk). Hence, vi(Ai) ≥ max(P1,...,P|J|)∈Π|J|(S) mink vi(Pk) = µ
|J |
i (S), and we
get that A is GMMS.
Next, we argue that GMMS implies EFX: [Caragiannis et al., 2016] have shown that that PMMS
implies EFX. By definition, GMMS implies PMMS. Hence, a GMMS allocation is guaranteed to
be EFX.
Note that [Caragiannis et al., 2016] also provided an example to show that maximin share
guarantee by itself does not imply EF1. Hence, an MMS allocation is not necessarily EFX. Con-
sider a fair division instance with three agents, five goods, and each agent values each good at
1. The maximin share of all the agents is 1. Thus, the allocation A1 = {g1, g2, g3}, A2 = {g4} and
A3 = {g5} satisfies MMS, but not EF1. This is because agents 2 and 3 continue to envy agent 1
even if a single good is removed from A1.
This, overall, shows that while MMS is not enough to guarantee weaker notions of envy free-
ness, GMMS ensures fairness in terms of such notions, and secures a place in the scale of fairness.
Next we will consider the complementary direction of going from bounded envy to groupwise
maximin fairness. In particular, we will establish existence and algorithmic results for approxi-
mate GMMS by considering a solution concept which is stronger than EF1, but weaker than EFX.
Specifically, we will define allocations which are envy-free up to one less-preferred good (EFL)—see
Definition 6 below—and show that such allocations are guaranteed to exist, when the valuations
are additive. Note that, in contrast, the generic existence of EFX allocations remains an interesting
open question. Furthermore, we will prove that EFL allocations can be computed in polynomial
time and, under additive valuations, such allocations imply 1/2-GMMS.
Definition 6. An allocation A = (A1, A2, . . . , An) is said to be envy-free up to one less-preferred
good (EFL) if for every pair of agents i, j ∈ [n] at least one of the following conditions hold:
• Aj contains at most one good which is positively valued by i; |Aj ∩ {g′ | vi(g′) > 0}| ≤ 1
• There exists a good g ∈ Aj such that vi(Ai) ≥ vi(Aj \ {g}) and vi(Ai) ≥ vi({g}).
The fact that an EFL allocation is EF1 follows directly from the definitions of these solution
concepts. Also, note that if an allocation (A1, . . . , An) is EFX then for any pair of agents i, j ∈ [n]
with |Aj ∩ {g′ | vi(g′) > 0}| > 1 the second condition in the definition of EFL holds. In particular,
write Aij := Aj ∩ {g′ | vi(g′) > 0} and consider two distinct goods gˆ, g˜ ∈ Aij . Since the allocation is
EFX, we have vi(Ai) ≥ vi(Aj \ {gˆ}) and vi(Ai) ≥ vi(Aj \ {g˜}). Note that gˆ ∈ Aj \ {g˜}, and, hence,
vi(Ai) ≥ vi(gˆ). This implies that good gˆ satisfies the second condition in Definition 6. Hence, any
EFX allocation is EFL as well.
With this new fairness notion, we have the following chain of implications: EF ⇒ GMMS ⇒
EFX⇒ EFL⇒ EF1.
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5 An Approximation Algorithm forGMMS
Our main result in this section shows that 1/2-GMMS allocations always exist under additive
valuation, and such allocations can be found efficiently.
Theorem 1. Every fair division instance with additive valuations admits a 1/2-approximate groupwise
maximin share allocation. Furthermore, such an allocation can be found in polynomial time.
Proof-Sketch The proof proceeds in two steps. First, we provide a constructive proof for the exis-
tence of EFL allocations, under additive valuations (Section 5.1). Next, we complete the proof by
showing that EFL implies 1/2-GMMS (in Section 5.2)
5.1 Existence of EFL Allocations
This section shows that EFL allocations are guaranteed to exist when the valuations are additive.
Specifically, we develop an algorithm that always finds such an allocation.
Lemma 1. Given any fair division instance with additive valuations, Algorithm 1 finds an EFL allocation
in polynomial time.
Algorithm 1 iteratively allocates the goods and maintains a partial allocation,A = (A1, . . . , An),
of the goods assigned so far. In each iteration, the algorithm selects an agent iwho is not currently
envied by any other agent, and allocates i an unassigned good of highest value (under vi).
Algorithm 1 Finding an EFL Allocation
Input : n agents, m items, and valuations vi{g} for each agent i ∈ [n] and for each good g ∈ [m].
Output: An EFL allocation.
1: Initialize allocation A = (A1, A2, . . . , An) with Ai = ∅ for each agent i ∈ [n], and M = [m].
2: Initialize directed envy graph G(A) = ([n], E) where E = ∅.
3: while M 6= ∅ do
4: Pick a source vertex i of G(A). {such a vertex always exists, since G(A) is acyclic.}
5: Pick g ∈ arg maxj∈M vi{g}.
6: Update Ai ← Ai ∪ {g} and M ←M \ {g}.
7: while the current envy graph G(A) contains a cycle do
8: Update A (using Lemma 2) to remove the cycle.
9: end while
10: end while
11: Return A.
Throughout the execution of the algorithm, the existence of an unenvied agent is ensured by
maintaining a directed graph, G(A), that captures the envy between agents. The nodes in this
envy graph represent the agents and it contains a directed edge from i to j iff i envies j, i.e.,
vi(Ai) < vi(Aj). Lemma 2, established in [Lipton et al., 2004], shows that if any iteration leads
to a cycle in the envy graph G(A), then we can always resolve it to obtain an acyclic envy graph
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without decreasing the valuation of any agents; for completeness, we provide a proof of Lemma 2.
It is relevant to that, since G(A) is acyclic for a partial allocationA, it necessarily contains a source
node, i.e., an agent i who is not envied by other agents.
Although, Algorithm 1 is similar to the algorithm developed in [Lipton et al., 2004]—which
efficiently finds EF1 allocations— here, instead of assigning goods in an arbitrary order, we always
allocate to an unenvied agent the available good she values the most. This is crucial for obtaining
an EFL allocation.
Lemma 2. [Lipton et al., 2004] Given a partial allocationA = (A1, . . . , An) of a subset of goods S ⊆ [m],
we can find another partial allocation B = (B1, . . . , Bn) of S in polynomial time such that
(i) The valuations of agents for their bundles do not decrease, that is, vi(Bi) ≥ vi(Ai) for all i ∈ [n].
(ii) The envy graph G(B) is acyclic.
Proof. If the envy graph of A is acyclic then the claim holds trivially. Otherwise, let us denote a
cycle in the graph G(A) by C = i1 → i2 → . . . → ik → i1. Now, we can reallocate the bundles as
follows: for all agents not in C, i.e., k /∈ {i1, i2, . . . , ik} set A′k = Ak, and for all the agents in the
cycle set A′i to be the bundle of their successor in C, i.e., set A
′
ia
= Ai(a+1) for 1 ≤ a < k along with
A′ik = Ai1 .
Note that after this reallocation we have vi(A′i) ≥ vi(Ai) for all i ∈ [n]. Furthermore, the
number of edges in G(A) strictly decreases: The edges in C do not appear in the envy graph of
(A′1, . . . , A′n) and if an agent k starts envying an agent in the cycle, say agent ia, then k must have
been envious of ia+1 in A. Edges between agents k and k′ which are not in C remain unchanged,
and edges going out of an agent i in the cycle C can only get removed, since i valuation for the
bundle assigned to her bundle increases. Therefore, we can repeatedly remove cycles and keep
reducing the number of edges in the envy graph to eventually a find a partial allocation B that
satisfies the stated claim.
Proof of Lemma 1. Write A = (A1, . . . , An) to denote the allocation returned by Algorithm 1. First,
we note that an inductive argument proves that A is EF1. In fact, we will show that the EF1
condition holds for A with respect to the last (in terms of the algorithm’s allocation order) good
g assigned to each bundle Aj . Write gt to denote the good allocated in the tth iteration of Algo-
rithm 1; hence, the goods are allocated in the following order g1, g2, . . . , gm.
The initial partial allocation (∅, ∅, . . . , ∅) is EF1 (in fact, it is envy free). Now, say that in the
jth iteration the algorithm allocates good gj to agent i. Write Aj = (Aj1, . . . , Ajn) and Aj+1 =
(Aj+11 , . . . , A
j+1
n ), respectively, to denote the partial allocations before and after the jth iteration.
The induction hypothesis implies thatAj is EF1 with respect to the last assigned good. Therefore,
for every pair of agents r, s ∈ [n], we have vr(Ajr) ≥ vr(Ajs \ {ga}), where ga is the last good
assigned to the bundle Ajs (i.e., for any other good gb ∈ Ajs, we have b < a).
Since the good gj is allocated to agent i, it must be the case that i is a source vertex in G(Aj),
i.e., no agent envies i under Aj . This implies that, vr(Ajr) ≥ vr(Aji ) = vr((Aji ∪ {gj}) \ {gj})
for all r ∈ [n]. Note that at this point of time, gj is the last good assigned to the bundle Aji .
In addition, from the proof of Lemma 2, we know that Aj+1 is a permutation of the allocation
(Aj1, A
j
2, . . . , A
j
i ∪ {gj}, . . . , Ajn), and vr(Aj+1r ) ≥ vr(Ajr) for all r ∈ [n]. Hence, for every pair of
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agents r, s ∈ [n] there exists a good ga ∈ Aj+1s such that vr(Aj+1r ) ≥ vr(Aj+1s \ {ga}). In addition, ga
is the last good assigned to the bundle Aj+1s . That is, the stated property holds for Aj+1 as well.
Now, we will use this observation to prove that A is EFL. Specifically, we show the EFL
conditions hold for, say, agent 1 (analogous arguments establish the claim for the other agents).
Suppose that, during the execution of the algorithm, agent 1 receives its first good, gt, in the tth
iteration. Note that the partial allocation before the tth iteration, say At = (At1, . . . , Atn), satisfies
|Ati ∩ {g′ ∈ [m] : v1(g′) > 0}| ≤ 1 for all i ∈ [n]. This bound follows from the observation that
during any previous iteration s < t, the selected source vertex i (i.e., the agent that gets a new
good during the sth iteration) does not contain any good which is positively valued by agent 1;
otherwise, i would have been envied by 1, contradicting the fact that it is a source vertex. Hence,
each bundle in At contains at most one good from the set {g′ ∈ [m] : v1(g′) > 0}.
Let us now consider the final allocation A = (A1, . . . , An) and any agent j ∈ [n]. If |Aj ∩ {g′ ∈
[m] : v1(g
′) > 0}| ≤ 1, then the first condition in the definition of EFL holds and we are done,
else if |Aj ∩ {g′ ∈ [m] : v1(g′) > 0} | > 1, then bundle Aj must have received a good after the tth
iteration. This is consequence of the above-mentioned property of the partial allocation At. Write
g` to denote the last good allocated to the bundle Aj . We have ` > t, since g` was assigned to Aj
after the tth iteration. Also, in the tth iteration good gt was selected instead of g`, hence it must be
the case that v1(gt) ≥ v1(g`).
Note that, as mentioned before, the EF1 condition holds forAj with respect to g`, i.e., v1(A1) ≥
v1(Aj \ {g`}). In addition, Lemma 2 implies that v1(A1) ≥ v1({gt}). Therefore, if |Aj ∩ {g′ ∈
[m] : v1(g
′)}| > 1 for any j ∈ [n], then there exists a good g` such v1(A1) ≥ v1(Aj \ {g`}) and
v1(A1) ≥ v1(g`). Hence, A is an EFL allocation.
5.2 EFL implies ApproximateGMMS
Lemma 3. In any fair division instance with additive valuations, if an allocation A = (A1, . . . , An) is
EFL, then it is 1/2-GMMS allocation as well.
Proof. Fix an agent i and a set of k agents, J ⊆ [n] which contains i, i.e., |J | = k and J 3 i. Also, let
S = ∪j∈JAj denote the set of all the goods allocated to the agents in J . We will show that agent
if (A1, . . . , An) is EFL, then vi(Ai) is at least 12 times the maximin share of i restricted to S, i.e.,
vi(Ai) ≥ 12µki (S). This establishes the stated claim.
Write Si ⊆ [m] to denote the set of goods which are positively valued by i, Si := {g′ ∈ [m] |
vi(g
′) > 0}. Now, among the set of agents J \ {i} consider the ones who are allocated at most one
good from Si; specifically, let T := {j ∈ J \ {i} | |Aj ∩ Si| ≤ 1}. Write J ′ := J \ T , t′ := |J ′|, and
S′ = ∪j∈J ′Aj . Note that the agent i belongs to the group J ′, and for all j ∈ J ′ we have |Aj∩Si| > 1.
Therefore, the fact that A is EFL implies that, for all j ∈ J ′, there exists a good g(j) ∈ Aj such that
vi(Ai) ≥ vi(Aj \{g(j)}) and vi(Ai) ≥ vi(g(j)). In other words, for the additive valuation vi, we have
2vi(Ai) ≥ vi(Aj).
We will now establish the multiplicative bound with respect to µt
′
i (S
′) (the maximin share of i
restricted to S′) and prove that µt′i (S
′) ≥ µti(S). This will complete the proof. Since vi is additive,
an averaging argument gives us
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µt
′
i (S
′) ≤ 1
t′
vi(S
′) =
1
t′
∑
j∈J ′
vi(Aj) ≤ 1
t′
2t′vi(Ai)
Here, the last inequality uses the bound 2vi(Ai) ≥ vi(Aj) for all j ∈ J ′. Therefore, vi(Ai) ≥
1
2µ
t′
i (S
′). To complete the proof, we need to show that µt′i (S
′) ≥ µti(S). Note that—while consider-
ing the maximin shares of agent i—we can restrict our attention to Si (the set of goods which are
positively valued by i). In particular, the equalities µt
′
i (S
′) = µt′i (S
′∩Si) and µti(S) = µti(S∩Si) im-
ply that, without loss of generality, we can work under the assumptions that S ⊆ Si and S′ ⊆ Si.
Effectively, for all j ∈ J , we can slightly abuse notation and denote Aj ∩ Si by Aj . Now, consider
the allocationM = (M1, . . . ,Mt) ∈ arg max
(B1,...,Bt)∈Πt(S)
min
j∈[t]
vi(Bj).
We have, minj∈J vi(Mj) = µti(S). Also, note that |Aj | ≤ 1 for each agent j ∈ K = J \ J ′.
Therefore, there are at most |K| = t− t′ bundles inMwith items from S \S′. We choose t′ bundles
fromM = (M1, . . . ,Mt) which do not contain any item from S \ S′. Let us call these new bundles
M′ = (M ′1, . . . ,M ′t′). By the definition ofM, the value of each such bundle for agent i is greater
than or equal to µti(S), that is, vi(M
′
j) ≥ µti(S) for all j ∈ [t′]. Since we have assumed that all items
have nonnegative values, adding more items from the remaining (t − t′) bundles to any of the
bundles inM′ can only increase the value of the partitions. Thus, µt′i (S′) ≥ µti(S), which implies
that vi(Ai) ≥ 12µti(S).
Lemmas 1 and 3 directly establish Theorem 1.
We note that (both in terms of the algorithm and EFL’s implication) the approximation guar-
antee established in Theorem 1 is essentially tight. Appendix A provides an example to establish
this observation.
6 Guaranteed Existence ofGMMS Allocations in Restricted Settings
In this section, we prove the existence of GMMS for relevant valuation classes.
Theorem 2. Groupwise maximin share allocations always exist under additive, binary valuations, i.e.,
such allocations exist when the additive valuations satisfy vi(g) ∈ {0, 1} for all agents i ∈ [n] and goods
g ∈ [m].
Proof. To prove the theorem, it suffices to show that under additive, binary valuations, EF1 implies
GMMS. Recall that EF1 allocations are guaranteed to exist. Let A = (A1, . . . , An) be an EF1
allocation. Fix an agent i and a group of agents J 3 i. Also, write S := ⋃j∈J Aj . Next we complete
the proof by showing that vi(Ai) ≥ µ|J |i (S).
Since the valuations are binary, for any subset of goods B ⊆ [m], the total value vi(B) is a non-
negative integer. Therefore, µ|J |i (S) must be a non-negative integer. Moreover, since the valuations
are additive, we have 1|J |vi(S) ≥ µ
|J |
i (S). In addition, the facts that (a) A is an EF1 allocation and
(b) the maximum value of any good is 1 imply vi(Ai) ≥ vi(Aj)− 1 for all j ∈ J . Therefore,
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vi(Ai) =
1
|J | |J |vi(Ai) ≥
1
|J |
vi(Ai) +∑
j∈J\{i}
(vi(Aj)− 1)

≥ 1|J |(vi(S)− |J |+ 1) =
1
|J |vi(S)−
|J | − 1
|J |
≥ µ|J |i (S)−
|J | − 1
|J | > µ
|J |
i (S)− 1.
The last inequality vi(Ai) − µ|J |i (S) > −1 implies vi(Ai) ≥ µ|J |i (S) since vi(Ai) and µ|J |i (S) are
integers. Overall, the inequality vi(Ai) ≥ µ|J |i (S) shows that the EF1 allocation A is GMMS as
well. This completes the proof.
Note that the following theorem holds for general combinatorial valuations and is not limited
to the additive case.
Theorem 3. If all the n agents in a fair division instance have the same valuation (i.e., vi = vj for all
i, j ∈ [n]), then a groupwise fair allocation is guaranteed to exist.
Proof. Given a fair division instance with m goods and n agents with the same valuation function
v, we will define an order on Πn([m]), the set of n-partitions of [m]. For vectors u, u′ ∈ Rn, we say
that u lexicographically dominates u′ if u = u′, or there exists an index a ∈ [n] such that u(a) > u′(a)
and for all b < a we have u(b) = u′(b); here, u(k) and u
′
(k) denotes the kth smallest component
of u and u′, respectively. Extending this definition, an allocation (A1, . . . , An) ∈ Πn([m]) is said
to lexicographically dominate another allocation (B1, . . . , Bn) ∈ Πn([m]) iff the vector of valua-
tions (v(A1), . . . , v(An)) lexicographically dominates (v(B1), . . . , v(Bn)). Note that lexicographic
domination defines a total order over the equivalence classes of n-partitions. In addition, up to
permutations of the valuation vector, there exists a unique maximal allocation with respect to this
order, i.e., there exists an allocationA∗ = (A∗1, . . . , A∗n) which lexicographically dominates all other
allocations.
We will show thatA∗ is GMMS. For contradiction, say that this is not the case, and the GMMS
condition is violated for subset J ⊆ [n] and agent i ∈ J , i.e., vi(A∗i ) < µ|J |i (S); here S := ∪j∈JA∗j .
Since the valuations are identical, the maximin share of each agent in J restricted to S is the same,
i.e., µ|J |i (S) = µ
|J |
k (S), for all k ∈ J . Hence, GMMS condition must also be violated for agent
arg minj∈J v(A∗j ). This observation and the definition of maximin shares imply that there exists a
|J |-partition of S, say (M1, . . . ,M|J |), such that min1≤a≤|J | v(Ma) > minj∈J v(A∗j ).
Now, consider an allocation B = (B1, . . . , Bn) obtained fromA∗ by (i) replacing the |J | bundles
A∗js (for j ∈ J) with Mas (for 1 ≤ a ≤ |J |), and (ii) setting Bk = A∗k for all k /∈ J . Note that,
even under any permutation of the bundles, the allocation B 6= A∗. Also, the construction of B
ensures that it lexicographically dominatesA∗. This contradicts the maximality (under the defined
lexicographic order) of A∗ and, hence, the stated claim follows.
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7 Some Empirical Results
For an experimental investigation, we generated 1000 random instances, for several combinations
of n agents and m goods (n ranging from 3 to 5, and m from 3 to 11), by randomly drawing
the valuations from two different distributions (a) gaussian distribution with mean 0.5, standard
deviation 0.1 (truncated at 0 to ensure nonnegative valuations) and (b) uniform distribution [0, 1].
These are the same set of experiments that [Bouveret and Lemaıˆtre, 2014] carried out for studying
the existence of various fairness notions under additive valuations.
In addition, we considered the modification of these instances wherein all the agents agree on
the same ranking of the goods, but may have different valuations for the same item. Such instances
are said to have same-order preferences (SOP), and were studied by [Bouveret and Lemaıˆtre,
2014]. They showed that, when it comes to (empirically) finding an MMS allocation, SOP instances
are the hardest. We observe similar results for GMMS: finding a GMMS allocation, done using
brute-force search, requires noticeably more time in SOP instances, than in non-SOP instances.
Our empirical results and observations are summarized below:
1. GMMS allocations exist empirically in all randomly generated instances (which is similar to
the experimental results for MMS [Bouveret and Lemaıˆtre, 2014]). These simulation results
indicate that we may not fall short on such generic existence results by strengthening the
maximin solution concept.
2. Allocations generated by the EFL algorithm (Algorithm 1) on the random instances achieve
an approximation factor of 0.98 (on an average) which is better than our theoretically ob-
tained worst-case bound of 0.5. Figure (1) tabulates the approximation factor for GMMS
using the EFL algorithm, averaged over 1000 instances. The approximation factor (on aver-
age) is lower for SOP than for non-SOP instances. Moreover, we observe that, for randomly
generated instances, the approximation factor is better when the number of items is a multi-
ple of the number of agents. This may be because of the round robin nature of the algorithm
which gives an agent her most desirable good at each round.
3. As expected, our proposed EFL algorithm ran much faster than the (exponential-time) al-
gorithm for finding exact GMMS. Our algorithm was about 107 times faster than the exact
GMMS computation on a machine with a quad Intel Core i7 processor and 32 GB RAM.
8 Conclusion and Future Work
In this paper, we introduced the concept of GMMS to address fair allocation of indivisible goods,
thereby strengthening the well-studied notions of MMS and PMMS. We established the existence
of 1/2-GMMS under additive valuations, and developed an efficient algorithm for finding such
allocations. We also proved that under specific settings exact GMMS allocations always exist. In
addition, GMMS allocations were always found in our experiments (over a large number of ran-
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Figure 1: EFL algorithm results on approximate GMMS.
domly generated instances). This indicates why it seems nontrivial to obtain simpler7 examples
which refute the guaranteed existence of GMMS allocations. Finding an instance which admits an
MMS allocation but not a GMMS allocation remains an interesting, open problem.
Our work addresses key questions about groupwise fairness when the valuations are addi-
tive, and it motivates the study of this notion in more general settings, e.g., under submodular
valuations, or under additional constraints, such as the ones considered by [Bouveret et al., 2017].
Another interesting direction of future work is to understand groupwise fair division of indivisible
goods among strategic agents.
7The intricate examples showing the nonexistence of MMS under additive valuations [Procaccia and Wang, 2014,
Kurokawa et al., 2016] also serve as counterexamples for GMMS.
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Appendix
A Tight Example for Algorithm 1
This section shows that the approximation guarantee established in Theorem 1 is essentially tight.
Specifically, consider the following fair division instance with n agents and (3n − 2) goods. The
additive valuation of agent 1 is as follows:
• For each of the first n goods—say, {l1, l2, . . . , ln}—the valuation of agent 1 is equal to one.
• The next (n− 1) goods, {d2, d3, . . . , dn}, are valued at (n− 1)/n by agent 1.
• Finally, the remaining (n− 1) goods, {s2, s3, . . . , sn}, are valued at 1/n.
The remaining (n− 1) agents value l1 at 2, and they value {s2, . . . , sn} at 1. In addition, goods
{d2, d3, . . . , dn} along with {l2, . . . , ln} have a value of 1/2− 1/n for these (n− 1) agents.
Consider allocation A = (A1, ..., An) wherein the first agent gets bundle A1 = {l1}, and the
remaining agents obtain Ak = {lk, dk, sk} for all k > 1. This allocation is EFL with respect to all
the agents. But, the maximin share of agent 1 is close to 2; specifically, in the following n-partition
the value of each bundle for agent 1 is equal to 2− 1/n: {l1, s2, . . . , sn}, {l2, d2}, . . . , {ln, dn}.
Hence, as n increases, the approximation guarantee of this EFL allocation for agent 1 ap-
proaches 1/2.
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Furthermore, we can ensure that the proposed algorithm finds this EFL allocation. Specifically,
during the algorithm’s execution, say, agent 1 picks l1 at the beginning. The other agents now
pick in the remaining iterations. Since the other agents value the goods sjs the most among the
unallocated goods, agents 2 to agent nwill select s2 to sn during the initial iterations. At this point
of time, the partial allocation is {l1}, {s2}, . . . , {sn}.
Agent 1 is still envied the most. Now, agents 2 to n pick d2 to dn one after the other (the ties are
broken in favor of the target allocation). The intermediate allocation obtained by the algorithm
is {l1}, {s2, d2}, . . . , {sn, dn}. Still, Agent 1 is the most envied one and she does not envy others.
Goods l2 to ln remain unallocated. Agents 2 to n finally select them, one after the other, to give us
the required EFL allocation.
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